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The contemporary relevance of historic titles and rights has been questioned following the 
adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC),1 the resulting endorsement of a significant 
expansion of the jurisdiction of the coastal state, and the consolidation of the jurisdictional regime 
of maritime zones. Historic titles and historic rights have been a complicated issue in the law of 
the sea both conceptually and practically. These concepts have attracted attention in academic 
literature mainly in papers discussing the validity of specific claims.2 Few studies deal with the 
issue in a comprehensive way,3 the most recent is by Clive Symmons Historic Waters in the Law 
of the Sea: A Modern Reappraisal.4 On the other hand, historic claims have not been addressed 
comprehensively by international courts and tribunals. They have been invoked by litigants within 
the framework of maritime delimitation, and courts and tribunals have examined their validity and 
                                                 
* I would like to express my thanks to Professor Clive Symmons, Trinity College Dublin, for his useful comments on 
my article. Any errors are the author’s sole responsibility. 
1 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
2 See, for example: F. Francioni, “The Status of the Gulf of Sirte in International Law,” 11 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce (1984), pp. 311-326; D. Pharand, “Historic waters in international law with special 
reference to the Arctic,” (1971) 21 University of Toronto Law Journal, p. 1; C. Symmons, “Historic waters and historic 
rights in the South China Sea: A critical appraisal” in S. Wu and M. Valencia (eds.), UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea and the South China Sea, (Routledge, 2015), pp. 191-238; K. Zou, “Historic rights in the South China Sea” 
ibid, pp. 239-150; K. Zou, “Historic rights in international law and in China’s practice,” 32 Ocean Development and 
International Law (2001), pp. 149-168; and F. Dupuy and P.-M. Dupuy, “A legal analysis of China’s historic rights 
claim in the South China Sea” 107 American Journal of International Law (2013), pp. 124-141. 
3 See, however, Y.Z. Blum, Historic Titles in International Law (Nijhoff, 1965); M. Wesley Clark, Historic Bays and 
Waters: A Regime of Recent Beginnings and Continued Usage (Oceana, 1994); A. Gioia “Historic Titles,” Max Planck 
Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (2013); and Study prepared by the U.N. Secretariat, “Juridical Regime of 
Historic Waters, including Historic Bays” Doc. A/CN.4/143, (March 1962).   
4 C. Symmons, Historic Waters in the Law of the Sea: A Modern Reappraisal (Brill/M.Nijhoff, 2008). 
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relevance to the maritime boundary in this respect. Courts in the United States have also addressed 
the validity of historic waters claims by states vis-à-vis the federal government.5 A number of 
issues are uncertain: the definition and scope of historic waters, titles and rights; the contemporary 
relevance of such claims in the light of the LOSC; and the conditions and requirements for their 
establishment. 
The South China Sea Arbitration6 between the Philippines and China raised important issues 
regarding the contemporary relevance and validity of historic claims. The Tribunal made some 
interesting pronouncements with respect to a crucial aspect related to the relationship between the 
LOSC and historic claims. This is the first time that a tribunal has contributed with such clarity to 
the issue of historic rights. However, as will be set out in this article, the reasoning and conclusions 
reached by the Tribunal are not without problems.  
The aim of this article is to examine the concept of historic rights and titles in the law of the 
sea in the light of the South China Sea Arbitration and to assess the contribution of the Awards to 
the clarification of these concepts. The article first assesses the approach of the Tribunal with 
respect to the relationship between the LOSC and historic claims in general, and then it identifies 
certain types of historic rights and evaluates their contemporary relevance with reference to the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. It further examines the requirements for the 
establishment of historic rights with a focus on the Chinese historic claim as identified and 
discussed by the Tribunal, and finally it assesses the scope and content of the optional exception 
to the compulsory jurisdiction in article 298(1)(a)(i) LOSC regarding disputes involving historic 
titles and the decision of the Tribunal on jurisdiction.  
                                                 
5 See for example Alaska v United States 545 U.S. 75 (2005). 
6 The Republic of the Philippines v the People’s Republic of China, PCA Case Nº 2013-19 in the matter of the South 





II. Overview of the South China Sea Arbitration Regarding Historic Rights and the 
Decision  
 
In its notification and statement of claim, the Philippines asked the Tribunal to:  
declare that the parties’ respective rights and obligations in regard to the waters, seabed 
and maritime features of the South China Sea are governed by UNCLOS, and that 
China’s claims based on its ‘nine dash line’ are inconsistent with the Convention and 
therefore invalid.7  
 
In its memorial, the Philippines clarified further its request: 
1. China’s maritime entitlements in the South China Sea, like those of the Philippines 
may not extend beyond those permitted by the LOSC. 
2. China’s claims to sovereign rights and jurisdictions and to historic rights with respect 
to the maritime areas of the South China Sea encompassed by the so-called nine-dash 
line are contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect to the extent that they 
exceed the geographic and substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under 
LOSC.8 
 
In the Jurisdiction Award, the Tribunal clarified certain aspect related to the existence and 
scope of the dispute concerning historic rights. With respect to whether the dispute concerned the 
interpretation and application of the Convention as required by article 297, the Tribunal found that: 
this is accordingly not a dispute about the existence of specific historic rights, but 
rather a dispute about historic rights in the framework of the Convention. A dispute 
concerning the interaction of the Convention with another instrument or body of law, 
including the question of whether rights arising under another body of law were or 
were not preserved by the Convention, is unequivocally a dispute concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Convention.9 
  
The Tribunal also found that “the existence of a dispute over these issues is not diminished by the 
fact that China has not clarified the meaning of the nine-dash line or elaborated on its claim to 
                                                 
7 Ibid., para. 28. 
8 The Republic of the Philippines v the People’s Republic of China, PCA Case Nº 2013-19 in the matter of the South 
China Arbitration, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 29 October 2015, available on the PCA website, supra 
note 6, para. 101. 
9 Ibid., para 168. 
3 
 
historic rights.”10 The Tribunal, however, linked its jurisdictional competence to deal with this 
issue with the merits of the case and especially the nature of China’s historic claim, and reserved 
a decision on its jurisdiction for the merits.11 
In its Award on the merits, the Tribunal started by assessing whether it had jurisdiction to 
address the Philippines’ substantive submissions. For this, the Tribunal examined the nature and 
scope of China’s claim to historic rights while noting that: “China has never expressly clarified 
the nature or scope of its claimed historic rights. Nor has it ever clarified its understanding of the 
meaning of the ‘nine-dash line.”12 It examined China’s legislation, activities and official 
statements13 and particularly stressed “China’s commitment to respect both freedom of navigation 
and overflight.”14 It concluded that:  
on the basis of China’s conduct, the Tribunal understands that China claims rights to 
the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-dash line’, but (apart from the 
territorial sea generated by any islands) does not consider that those waters form part 
of its territorial sea or internal waters.15  
 
These were found to be historic rights short of sovereignty. Different views have been expressed 
in the academic literature with respect to the scope of the Chinese historic claim and its link to the 
nine-dash line16 ranging from the lack of any historic claim over the waters17 to an historic claim 
to a EEZ/continental shelf “as ‘historic rights with tempered sovereignty”.18 The conclusion of the 
                                                 
10 Ibid., para. 167. 
11 Ibid., para. 398. 
12 Ibid., para. 160 and South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 180. 
13 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, paras. 207-214. 
14 Ibid., para. 213. See also reference to a statement of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding an “insightful 
formulation by China of its claims in the South China Sea”, para. 206, footnote 199.  
15 Ibid., para. 214. 
16 See an overview in L. Jinming and L. Dexia, “The dotted line on the Chinese map of the South China Sea: a note” 
34 Ocean Development and International Law (2003), p. 291  
17 M. Sheng-Ti Gau, “Issues of jurisdiction in cases of default of appearance” in S. Talmon and B.B. Jia, (eds.) The 
South China Sea Arbitration: A Chinese Perspective (Hart, 2014), pp. 88-89.  
18 Zou, “Historic Rights in International Law,” supra note 2, p. 160: “since it is referable to the EEZ and continental 
shelf regimes, such a claim involves sovereign rights and jurisdiction but not full sovereignty”. Similarly, see: Z. Gao 
and B.B. Jia “The nine-dash line in the South China Sea: history, status and implications” 107 American Journal of 
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Tribunal in this respect appears justified. The fact that China has never sought to restrict freedom 
of navigation in practice19 can lead to the conclusion that the historic claim – albeit ambiguous - 
is not a sovereignty claim to a territorial sea or internal waters.  
With respect to the scope of the optional exception in article 298(1)(a)(i), especially 
concerning “historic title,” the Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction as China’s claim was not to 
a historic title as this refers to sovereignty claims.20 This issue is examined in Section IV.  
The Tribunal identified three distinct but interrelated questions which formed part of its 
reasoning for addressing the Philippines’ Submissions No. 1 and 2. The first and main question 
referred to the relationship between the LOSC and pre-existing rights to living and non-living 
resources:  
[D]oes the Convention, and in particular its rules for the EEZ and continental shelf, 
allow for the preservation of rights to living and non-living resources that are at 
variance with the provisions of the Convention and which may have been established 
prior to the Convention’s entry into force by agreement or unilateral act?21 
  
The second and third questions referred specifically to whether China had acquired “historic rights 
and jurisdiction over living and non-living resources in the waters of the South China Sea beyond 
the limits of the territorial sea” prior to the entry into force of the Convention (question 2) and “in 
the years since the conclusion of the Convention” (question 3).22 The following section focuses 
mainly on the examination of the first question related to the relationship between historic claims 
and the LOSC.  
                                                 
International Law (2013), p. 108. These authors refer to additional (to the LOSC) “historical rights of fishing, 
navigation, and other marine activities (including the exploration and exploitation of resources, mineral or otherwise.”  
19 See, for example, the Statement of Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Chan Jian “News briefing by Chinese 
Foreign Ministry” cited in S. Yann-Huei and K. Zou, “Maritime legislation of mainland China and Taiwan: 
Developments, comparison, implications and potential challenges for the US” 31 Ocean Development and 
International Law (2000), p. 322.  
20 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 229. 
21 Ibid., para. 234 
22 Ibid.  
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III. Historic Claims and the Law of the Sea Convention  
The Tribunal concluded that “upon China’s accession to the Convention and its entry into force, 
any historic rights that China may have had to the living and non-living resources within the ‘nine-
dash line’ were superseded, as a matter of law and as between the Philippines and China, by the 
limits of the maritime zones provided for by the Convention.”23 The Tribunal relied on articles 311 
and 293(1) of the LOSC. With respect to article 311, it noted that it “considers that this provision 
applies equally to the interaction of the Convention with other norms of international law, such as 
historic rights, that do not take the form of an agreement.”24 The Tribunal pointed out that “these 
provisions mirror the general rules of international law concerning the interaction of different 
bodies of law, which provide that the intent of the parties to a convention will control its 
relationship with other instruments.”25 According to the Tribunal, a combination of article 311 and 
293(1) demonstrates that only those pre-existing rights that are either expressly “permitted or 
preserved such as in articles 10 and 15” or compatible with the LOSC would be preserved.26 It 
further clarified how this incompatibility was to be ascertained: 
such prior norms will not be incompatible with the Convention where their operation 
does not conflict with any provision of the Convention or to the extent that 
interpretation indicates that the Convention intended the prior agreements, rules or 
rights to continue in operation.27 
  
The Tribunal noted that “where independent rights and obligations have arisen prior to the entry 
into force of the Convention and are incompatible with its provisions, the principles set out in 
                                                 
23 Ibid., para. 262.  
24 Ibid., para. 235.  
25 Ibid., para. 237. 
26 Ibid., para. 238(a). 
27 Ibid., para. 238(b). 
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article 30(3) of the Vienna Convention and article 293 of the Convention provide that the 
Convention will prevail over the earlier, incompatible rights or obligations.”28  
The approach of the Tribunal is problematic in several different respects. There is nothing 
in the reasoning of the Tribunal to explain why article 311, which explicitly refers to the 
relationship between the LOSC and conventions and international agreements, could be 
analogically applied to the relationship between the LOSC and historic rights as rules of customary 
international law. Similarly, it is unclear why the Tribunal considered that article 30(3) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)29 would be applicable when this provision 
clearly refers to “successive treaties relating to the same subject matter.” What is more, article 293 
of the LOSC concerns dispute settlement and the applicable law and not the relationship between 
the LOSC and other rules of international law, including historic rights. The relationship between 
treaties and customary international law is complex. The regulation of their relationship has been 
avoided in international instruments and it is regulated by customary international law and general 
interpretative principles (i.e. lex posterior, lex specialis).30 Whereas it can be said that the 
principles concerning the relationship between treaties (lex posterior, lex specialis) can be applied 
in the relationship between treaties and custom, this does not mean that the relevant provisions of 
the VCLT, which explicitly regulates treaties, and the LOSC provisions concerning its relationship 
with other agreements would also apply to its relationship with customary international law or 
with pre-established rights. The only relevant provision that the LOSC entails with respect to 
customary international law, and which the Tribunal did not make reference to, is in its Preamble: 
“affirming that matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and 
                                                 
28 Ibid., para. 238(d). 
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332. 




principles of general international law.”31 There is no explicit provision in the LOSC prohibiting 
the preservation of such rights or nullifying them. Historic rights, which are established on the 
basis of a particularised regime and can thus be regarded as lex specialis, cannot be superseded by 
a general treaty without explicit reference to them.  
The Tribunal further examined “whether the Convention nevertheless intended the continued 
operation of such historic rights, such that China’s claims should be considered not incompatible 
with the Convention.”32 In order to answer this question, the Tribunal examined the regime of the 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and found that:  
as a matter of ordinary interpretation, the (a) express inclusion of an article setting out 
the rights of other states and (b) attention given to the rights of other states in the 
allocation of any excess catch preclude the possibility that the Convention intended 
for other states to have rights in the EEZ in excess of those specified.33  
 
The Tribunal clarified:  
The notion of sovereign rights over living and non-living resources is generally 
incompatible with another state having historic rights to the same resources, in 
particular if such historic rights are considered exclusive, as China’s claim to historic 
rights appears to be.34  
 
Similarly, for the continental shelf, the Tribunal found that “the provisions of the Convention 
concerning the continental shelf are even more explicit that rights to the living and non-living 
resources pertain to the coastal state exclusively.”35 
The Tribunal also stressed the comprehensiveness of the regulatory regime of the LOSC and 
the intention of the drafters to settle all issues related to the law of the sea (especially related to 
jurisdictional claims) and to provide stability and order, as manifested in the closing statement of 
                                                 
31 The Philippines had argued that this is a matter regulated by the Convention. Philippines’ Memorial, para. 4.74, 
available on the PCA website, supra note 6. 
32 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 239. 
33 Ibid., para. 243.  
34 Ibid., para. 243.  
35 Ibid., para. 244. 
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the President of UNCLOS III and the LOSC Preamble.36  Accepting the Philippines’s argument in 
this respect, the Tribunal also found that: 
the same objective of limiting exceptions to the Convention to the greatest extent 
possible is also evident in article 309, which provides that “no reservations or 
exceptions may be made to this Convention unless expressly permitted by other 
articles of this Convention”.37  
 
This approach reflects views which have been expressed in academic literature especially related 
to historic rights in the EEZ and the continental shelf.38  
Nevertheless, the Tribunal failed to consider the nature and rationale of historic rights which 
are linked to the non-disturbance and preservation of a continuous, long-established and accepted 
situation with the view to providing stability. This is obviously different from existing treaties 
which the Tribunal used as analogy. Historic titles/rights in this respect share elements with the 
concept of historic consolidation which, according to Jennings, relates to the “fundamental interest 
of the stability of territorial situations from the point of view of order and peace.”39 The desired 
stability was also noted by the Tribunal in the Grisbadarna Arbitration: “it is a well-established 
principle of the law of nations that the state of things that actually exists and has existed for a long 
time should be changed as little as possible.”40 Historic titles have been thought – admittedly not 
                                                 
36 Ibid., para 245. 
37 Ibid., para. 245.  
38 See Symmons, supra note 2, pp. 195-6, 204-5. Some support of this can also be found in the U.N. Study on Historic 
Waters (which refers to the impact of the Geneva Conventions), supra note 3, para. 75-77:  
if the provisions of an article should be found to conflict with a historic title to a maritime area, and no 
clause is included in the article safeguarding the historic title, the provisions of the article must prevail as 
between the parties to the Convention. This seems to follow a contrario from the fact that articles 7 and 12 
have express clauses reserving historic rights; articles without such a clause must be considered not to admit 
an exception in favour of such rights.  
 
See also, Limits in the Seas No 143: China: maritime claims in the South China Sea (U.S. Department of State, 2014), 
p. 19 and R. Beckman, “China, UNCLOS and the South China Sea,” Asian Society of International Law Third Biennial 
Conference (August 2011), para. 34 available at http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/AsianSIL-
Beckman-China-UNCLOS-and-the-South-China-Sea-26-July-2011.pdf. 
39 R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester University Press, 1963), p. 24.  
40 Grisbadarna case (Norway v Sweden), Award of the Tribunal of 23 October 1909, p. 6, available at 
https://pcacases.com/web/view/77 .  
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without controversy - to be related to acquisitive prescription whose rationale is also to “preserve 
international order and stability.”41  
Despite the fact that the U.N. Study on Historic Waters rejected the exceptional character of 
historic rights relying on the lack of clear and certain rules concerning maritime delimitation at the 
time,42 the majority of writers accept that historic rights are exceptional rights which deviate from 
generally applicable rules.43 Some authors have highlighted the overlap between concepts such as 
prescription, customary rights and historic rights. Fitzmaurice has referred to them as special 
rights: 
different from, and in principle contrary to, the ordinary rules of law applicable, ... 
built up by a particular state or states through a process of prescription – leading to the 
emergence of a usage or customary or historic rights in favour of such state or states.44 
  
McGibbon commenting on the category suggested by Fitzmaurice states that “the concepts of 
prescription, customary right and historic right overlap.”45 These might be cases of special 
customary law referring to and regulating a particular and individualised situation. Historic claims 
originated from the fact that states “laid claim to and exercised jurisdiction over such areas of the 
sea adjacent to their coasts as they considered to be vital to their security or to their economy.”46 
Historic rights should not be perceived to be incompatible with the LOSC but exceptions 
                                                 
41 Blum, supra note 3, p. 12. 
42 U.N. Study on Historic Waters, supra note 3, pp. 9-11. 
43 See an overview of this debate in D.P. O’Connell, The Law of the Sea Vol. I (Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 
420-3 and Blum, supra note 3, p. 247. See also U.N. Study on Historic Waters, supra note 3, p. 7-9, with respect to the 
views of scholars.  
44 G. Fitzmaurice, “The law and procedure of the ICJ, 1951-54: General Principles and sources of Law” 30 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1953), p. 68.  
45 I.C. McGibbon, “Customary International Law and acquiescence” 33 British Yearbook of International Law (1957), 
p. 122. Blum, supra note 3, pp. 52-57, regards historic rights as a category of special customary rights. H. Thirlway, 
“The law and procedure of the ICJ: 1960-1989 (Part II)”, 61 British Yearbook of International Law (1990), p. 82, 
suggests that “if practice apparently inconsistent with a general rule shows enough internal consistency it may reveal 
the existence of a local or special custom differing from the general rule; or of an exception to the general rule where 
special circumstances exist (e.g. the preferential fishing rights of a coastal state exceptionally dependent on fishing 
resources)”.  
46 U.N. Study on Historic Waters, supra note 3, pp. 6-7, para. 36.  
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recognised in general international law. Talmon argues that historic titles that “the rules on historic 
legal title and historic rights are quasi-superimposed as a separate layer of normativity over 
UNCLOS.”47  
As noted by the Tribunal, the LOSC intended to create a comprehensive regime for the 
regulation of ocean affairs, but this does not presuppose that any previously-established regimes 
were eliminated, especially since no explicit provision was included to this effect.48 The 
jurisdictional regime of the LOSC validated rights which might have been claimed as historic 
before, but it cannot be inferred from the Convention or its travaux preparatoires that states 
intended or were willing to generally waive any pre-established historic rights. Neither can this be 
inferred a contrario from article 15 as this provision relates to delimitation of the territorial sea 
and not generally to the preservation of historic rights.  
There is some indication from international jurisprudence that international courts and 
tribunals have accepted the preservation of historic rights in parallel to the jurisdictional regime 
established by the LOSC. In the Tunisia/Libya Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated 
that “historic titles must enjoy respect and be reserved as they have always been by long usage.”49 
In the Gulf of Fonseca Case, the ICJ repeated this statement and noted that it was “clearly 
necessary ... to investigate the particular history of the Gulf of Fonseca to discover what is the 
                                                 
47 S. Talmon, “Possible Preliminary objections to the Philippines’ claims” in Talmon and Jia, supra note 17, p. 51. 
48 See Barbados’s argument in Arbitration between Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, relating to 
the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf between them, decision of 11 April 2006, 
U.N. Reports of International Arbitral Awards, Vol XXVII, para. 140; see also para. 138: “it would be contrary to 
established methods of interpretation of treaties to read into a treaty an intention to extinguish pre-existing rights in 
the absence of express words to that effect’ and that acquired rights such as historic rights ‘survive unless explicitly 
terminated”. 
49 Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), [1982] I.C.J. Reports, para. 100. 
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‘regime’ of the Gulf resulting therefrom.”50 In the former case, the Court specifically referred to 
the draft (at that time) Law of the Sea Convention, and noted that:  
nor does the draft convention of the Third Conference on the law of the Sea contain 
any detailed provisions on the “regime” of historic waters: there is neither a definition 
of the concept nor an elaboration of the juridical regime of “historic waters” or 
“historic bays”. There are, however, references to “historic bays” or “historic titles” or 
historic reasons in a way amounting to a reservation to the rules set forth therein.51 
  
And the ICJ continued:  
it seems clear that the matter continues to be governed by general international law 
which does not provide for a single “regime” for “historic waters” or historic bays but 
only for a particular regime for each of the concrete recognised cases of “historic 
waters” or “historic bays”.52 
 
Referring to this pronouncement, Symmons observes that “the Court thus endorsed a potential 
particularised regime for each historic claim, and so for some diversity of types of historic 
regimes.”53 In this respect, the question of supersession of historic rights by the LOSC cannot be 
answered in abstracto.54 Since historic rights and titles create a special regime related to the 
specific historic circumstances, it cannot be considered that historic claims can be phased out as a 
whole, but the history of each individual situation needs to be examined taking into consideration 
the LOSC. This will depend on whether a historic claim meets the requirements for the 
establishment of historic rights in a specific maritime area.  
The Philippines attempted to stress the uniqueness of the Chinese claim to an extensive 
maritime area to demonstrate that international law had never recognised such expansive maritime 
                                                 
50 Case concerning Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras: Nicaragua Intervening), 
[1992] I.C.J. Reports, p. 589, para. 384. 
51 Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 49, para. 100. 
52 Ibid., para. 100. 
53 Symmons, supra note 2, p. 200. 
54 T. Cottier, Equitable Principles of Maritime Boundary Delimitation: The Quest for Distributive Justice in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p. 486, discusses the relevance of historic rights in maritime 
delimitation noting that: “the problem cannot be dismissed in summary terms. Neither would predomination or 
subjection in abstracto of such rights provide a satisfactory answer. Conclusive answers have to rely upon the legal 
nature of the shelf and the EEZ and the doctrine of intertemporal law.”  
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claims based on historic reasons.55 Similar views have been expressed in the academic literature.56 
Symmons argues that “the historic ‘EEZ-claim’ viewpoint also seems to ignore the precedents of 
history on exaggerated claims in the past where excessive claims such as by Czar Alexander’s no-
go zone off Alaska were ‘stymied at birth by immediate protests from the major powers, [causing 
it to be almost immediately withdrawn].”57 Talmon, on the other hand, suggests that sizeable 
historic claims were not uncommon; indeed the Philippines had raised a claim of historic rights 
covering the waters of its archipelago.58 As noted by Blum “the common feature of all these claims 
seems to be the belief that a special relationship exists between the water area concerned and the 
land territory enclosing it,” but “the legality of such an historic claim is to be measured, in the 
words of Jessup, ‘not by the size of the area affected, but by the definitiveness and duration of the 
assertion and the acquiescence of foreign powers’.”59 The validity of claims depends on whether 
the requirements for historic titles could be met, especially the element of acquiescence of other 
states, as it was unlikely that states would have acquiesced in expansive claims. On the other hand, 
some authors have acknowledged the “uniqueness” of the Chinese claim but have considered it to 
be a particularised regime of historic rights which could be established in customary international 
                                                 
55 South China Sea Arbitration, Merits Pleadings, Day 1, pp. 59-63, available on the PCA website, supra note 6: “In 
short, from the time of Grotius through the widespread acceptance of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
international law has not preserved, admitted or accepted claims to control vast areas of the sea in derogation or either 
the freedom of the seas or the rights of the immediately adjacent coastal state.” 
56 T. McDorman, “Rights and jurisdiction over resources in the South China Sea: UNCLOS and the nine-dash line” 
in S. Jayakumar, et al (eds.) South China Sea Disputes and the Law of the Sea (Elgar, 2014), p. 155, notes that “such 
a claim beyond near-shore waters would be exceptional and inconsistent with the history of the law of the sea where, 
until recently, what existed were narrow bands of national waters along a coast and wide expanses of high seas with 
which high seas freedom existed”. 
57 Symmons, supra note 2, p. 206.  
58 Talmon, supra note 47, pp. 49-50. See also Tonga’s claim to a rectangle of sea in the archipelago and comments by 
O’Connell, supra note 43, p. 418, with respect to its potential validity based on history: “History might validate the 
claim to the rectangle, as an exception to the law relating to the high seas, but only as a broadening of the area which 
could be claimed under the standard rules.” 
59 Blum, supra note 3, p. 256 quoting Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction (1927), p. 382.  
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law.60 It has been suggested that “the Chinese claim to sovereignty over the islands in the South 
China Sea and the adjacent waters could be regarded as such a ‘particular regime’.”61 The Tribunal 
did not specifically refer to the particularities of the Chinese historic claim in this part of its Award, 
but took a broader perspective concerning the impact of the LOSC on all pre-established historic 
rights/titles in areas beyond the territorial sea within the framework of the historic development of 
these zones.  
The ICJ had discussed historic rights in the Qatar/Bahrain Case62 and indirectly in the Gulf 
of Maine Case63 with respect to maritime delimitation. Despite the fact that the Court rejected the 
arguments concerning the impact of any historic rights upon the maritime boundary on the basis 
of the facts in the Cases, it did not express any views concerning their general redundancy in the 
post-LOSC era. Both of these Cases are examined below with respect to the specific types of 
historic rights invoked and discussed by the Court.  The Tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen Case clearly 
accepted the relevance and applicability of historic rights despite the advent of the LOSC and the 
adoption of the relevant maritime zones. This Case referred to non-exclusive historic rights which 
are examined below, however, the Tribunal accepted the relevance of historic claims in both the 
territorial sea and areas beyond the territorial sea.64 The reasoning of the Tribunal in the 
Eritrea/Yemen Award seems to advocate that historic rights are not contradictory but are 
complementary to the LOSC, and the Tribunal noted they have been accepted in international law 
                                                 
60 Zou, “Historic Rights in International Law,” supra note 2, p. 160, has noted that “China has set a precedent in the 
state practice relating to historic rights. It is not clear whether China’s practice establishes a rule in international law, 
but it may already be influencing the development of the concept of historic rights.” Similarly, see N. Hong, UNCLOS 
and Ocean Dispute Settlement: Law and Politics in the South China Sea (Routledge, 2012), pp. 70-71.  
61 Talmon, supra note 47, p. 53. 
62 Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), [2001] I.C.J. 
Reports 40. 
63 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States), [1984] I.C.J. Reports 
246. 
64 Second Stage of the Proceedings between Eritrea and Yemen (Maritime Delimitation) Award of 17 December 1999, 
U.N. Reports of International Arbitration Awards, Vol. XXII, para. 109. 
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with the view to preserving an existing regime for the sake of stability (and thus the reference to 
servitude internationale).65 
In light of these general comments regarding the relationship between the LOSC and 
historic rights, the next section examines certain types of historic rights and their relationship with 
the regime of maritime zones established by the LOSC drawing from the jurisprudence of 
international courts and tribunals.  
IV. Types of Historic Rights and their Contemporary Relevance in the Law of the Sea 
 
A. Historic Titles Entailing Sovereignty (Historic Waters)  
The ICJ in the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case referred to “historic waters” as 
“usually [meaning] waters which are treated as internal waters, but which would not have that 
character if it were not for the existence of historic title.”66 This demonstrates that historic titles 
normally refer to the exercise of sovereignty and would create historic waters resembling the 
regime of internal or territorial waters depending on the acceptance of the right of innocent 
passage.67 The U.N. Study noted that “in principle, the scope of the historic title emerging from the 
continued exercise of sovereignty should not be wider in scope than the scope of the sovereignty 
actually exercised.”68 Historic waters, albeit a development of the concept of historic bays, can 
refer to any maritime areas – not necessarily bays or enclosed waters – adjacent to the coast.69 
Symmons notes that “historic waters must necessarily be adjacent to the claimant’s land territory 
                                                 
65 Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eritrea/Yemen), Award of 9 October 1998, U.N. Reports of 
International Arbitration Awards, Vol. XXII., para. 126. 
66 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway), [1951] I.C.J. Reports, p. 130. Dupuy and Dupuy, supra note 2, p. 139: 
“historic waters can only be an extension of internal or territorial sea.” 
67 U.N. Study on Historic Waters, supra note 3, p. 6, paras. 33-34.  
68 Ibid., p. 22, para. 164.  
69 Ibid., para. 34, referred to “straits, archipelagos and generally to all those waters which can be included in the 
maritime domain of a state.”  
15 
 
(on an analogy with the territorial sea regime).”70 Reference in article 10 of the LOSC of an 
exception to the delimitation of the territorial sea would imply that the LOSC recognises historic 
titles in areas adjacent to the coast. This was confirmed by the Tribunal in the South China Sea 
Arbitration which noted that articles 10 and 15 of the LOSC have preserved historic bays and 
historic titles in the territorial sea.71 The Tribunal also distinguished between the broader concept 
of historic rights and historic titles and noted that the latter refers to “claims of sovereignty over 
maritime areas derived from historical circumstances.”72 
B. Historic Rights Short of Sovereignty  
The Tribunal in its attempt to provide clarity with respect to “a cognizable usage among 
the various terms for rights deriving from historical processes” noted that:  
the term “historic rights” is general in nature and can describe any rights that a state 
may possess that would not normally arise under the general rules of international law, 
absent particular historical circumstances. Historic rights may include sovereignty, but 
may equally include more limited rights, such as fishing rights or rights of access that 
fall well short of a claim of sovereignty.73  
 
In contrast, “historic title … is used specifically to refer to historic sovereignty to land or maritime 
areas.”74 Historic rights short of sovereignty, however, take two different and distinct forms which 
were not clearly distinguished by the Tribunal: historic rights short of sovereignty which have a 
quasi-territorial or zonal impact beyond the territorial sea; and non-exclusive historic rights 
(mainly related to fishing rights). These types can be identified in the arguments of litigants before 
international tribunals and in the dicta of international and tribunals addressing relevant claims.  
 
                                                 
70 Symmons, supra note 4, p. 6. See also L.J. Bouchez, The Regime of Bays in International Law (Sythoff, 1964), p. 
238, “impossible for a non-coastal state to be entitled over a [historic] sea area situated near the coast of other states”.   
71 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 238(a). 
72 Ibid., para. 226.  
73 Ibid., para. 225. See similarly, Dupuy and Dupuy, supra note 2, p. 137.  
74 Ibid.  
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(i) Historic rights short of sovereignty which have a quasi-territorial or zonal impact 
beyond the territorial sea 
  
The establishment, and the type, of historic rights depend on the activities performed by a 
state over a specific maritime area. Whereas the exercise of sovereignty (activities a titre de 
souverain) could lead to the establishment of historic titles and historic waters, the exercise of 
exclusive sovereign rights (short of sovereignty) could lead to the establishment of historic rights 
with a quasi-territorial zonal impact beyond the territorial sea. This could relate to both the 
continental shelf and the EEZ depending on the activities performed and their zonal impact. The 
scope of the zonal impact would be determined and restricted to these activities, for example, 
exclusive fishing rights or exploitation of resources. It seems that this is how the Philippines and 
the Tribunal perceive the Chinese historic claim – as a zonal historic claim short of sovereignty 
but based on sovereign rights related to exclusive fishing rights and exploitation of resources.  
In cases of maritime delimitation, states and international courts and tribunals have referred 
to the possibility of the existence of such rights. Tunisia, in the Tunisia/Libya Case, referred to the 
“acquisition ... of historic rights over a substantial area of sea-bed” based on “long-established 
interests and activities of its population in exploiting the fisheries of the bed and waters of the 
Mediterranean off its coasts.”75 This argument related to the maritime boundary which, according 
to Tunisia’s submissions, should not encroach upon areas of the seabed where it had established 
historic rights.76 The ICJ accepted generally the need to respect existing historic titles but did not 
examine the validity of the Tunisian claim as it found that the maritime delimitation line did not 
encroach upon the areas over which Tunisia was claiming historic rights.77 In the Qatar/Bahrain 
Case, the Court examined the claim put forward by Bahrain with respect to historic rights based 
                                                 
75 Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 49, para. 98. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., para. 121. 
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on pearling. It found that there was evidence that “fishermen from all neighbouring countries were 
engaged in pearling activities in the banks” and therefore there was no exclusivity in the exercise 
of the activities. It also noted that “even if it had been found that this activity was exclusively 
performed by Bahrain, this activity seems in any event never to have led to the recognition of an 
exclusive quasi-territorial right (emphasis added) to the fishing grounds themselves or to the 
superjacent waters.”78 This may imply that the activities need to be performed not only exclusively 
but also with an animus domini and that one activity may not suffice to demonstrate such animus.79 
However, what can also be implied is that the ICJ did not preclude the possibility of the existence 
of “exclusive quasi-territorial rights” over certain maritime areas. A similar argument was raised 
by Barbados in the Trinidad and Tobago/Barbados Arbitration where it argued that the maritime 
delimitation should take into account “a centuries-old history of artisanal fishing.”80 Trinidad and 
Tobago conceded that: 
recent decisions have suggested that historic activity, whether in the form of fishing 
activities or other forms of resource exploitation, could be relevant to delimitation 
[but] only if they led to, or were bound up with, some form of recognition of territorial 
rights on the part of the state concerned.81  
 
The Tribunal found that there was no evidence of any traditional fishing rights as historicity was 
lacking,82 and, therefore, rejected Barbados’s argument for an adjustment of the equidistance line. 
In an obiter dictum the Tribunal noted that “determining an international maritime boundary 
                                                 
78 Qatar/Bahrain Case, supra note 62, para. 236. 
79 See Clark, supra note 3, p. 114, note 242 and A. Gioia, “Tunisia’s claim over adjacent seas and the doctrine of 
‘historic rights’” 11 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce (1984), p. 347: “a state cannot claim a vast 
area of sea as internal waters on the sole basis of ‘historic rights’ previously acquired for fishing purposes, unless it is 
possible to consider that those ‘historic rights’ were in fact indicative of a right of full sovereignty.” 
80 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration, supra note 48, paras. 125-129, also arguments para. 133-142. 
81 Ibid., para. 145.  
82 Ibid., para. 266, the Tribunal found that “the practice of long-range Barbadian fishing for flying fish, in waters 
which then were the high seas essentially began with the introduction of ice boats in the period 1978-1980, that is, 
some six to eight years before Trinidad and Tobago in 1986 enacted its Archipelagic Waters Act. ... Those short years 
are not sufficient to give rise to a tradition”. 
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between two states on the basis of traditional fishing on the high seas by nationals of one of those 
states is altogether exceptional”, and doubted the existence of a rule of international law in this 
respect.83 It further noted that this finding “does not however mean that the argument based upon 
fishing activities is either without factual foundation or without legal consequences.”84 With 
respect to Barbados’s argument about “establishing a right of access for Barbadian fishermen to 
flying fish within the EEZ of Trinidad and Tobago,” the Tribunal found that this was outside its 
jurisdiction.85 
The Gulf of Maine Case is often invoked as evidence of the supersession of historic rights 
by the LOSC,86 and was discussed in this respect by the Tribunal in the South China Sea 
Arbitration.87 In this Case, the United States had not invoked historic rights, but had referred to 
fishing and other maritime activities “as a major relevant circumstance for the purpose of reaching 
an equitable solution to the delimitation problem.”88 The Chamber of the ICJ did not refer to 
historic rights either, but mentioned the resemblance between U.S. claim and historic rights.89 It 
found that the maritime areas had been open to and “indeed fished by very many nationals” of 
other countries, with the result that any fishing activities by U.S. nationals were part of the freedom 
of the high seas.90 It was noted that the United States “may have been able at certain places and 
times … to achieve an actual predominance for its fisheries” but that this “preferential situation” 
                                                 
83 Ibid., para. 269.  
84 Ibid., para. 273. 
85 Ibid., para. 283.  
86 See Symmons, supra note 4, p. 28 note 28 and U.S. Limits in the Seas (China), supra note 38, p. 20. 
87 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 256. 
88 Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 63, para. 233.  
89 The Chamber noted that the U.S. reasoning was “somewhat akin to the invocation of historic rights, though that 
expression has not been used.” Ibid., para. 233. 
90 Ibid., para. 235. 
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did not continue following the adoption of 200 nm fishery zones.91 The Chamber thus rejected the 
relevance of this factor to the maritime delimitation.  
Despite the fact that international courts and tribunals have not accepted the existence of 
such rights due to lack of evidence, they have not precluded their possibility – though they have 
applied a high evidentiary threshold. Two issues however might be problematic. The first concerns 
the establishment of historic rights over the continental shelf. It has been suggested that no historic 
rights can be acquired on the continental shelf as this exists ipso facto and ab initio and therefore 
cannot be subjected to prescription.92 This argument is often associated with comments made by 
the ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya Case:  
it is clearly the case that, basically the notion of historic rights or waters and that of 
the continental shelf are governed by distinct legal regimes in customary international 
law. The first regime is based on acquisition and occupation, while the second is based 
on the existence of rights “ipso facto and ab initio”. No doubt both may sometimes 
coincide in part or in whole, but such coincidence can only be fortuitous [...].93 
  
Interestingly, Tunisia argued that the historic rights it acquired were in line with the natural 
prolongation aspect of the contemporary concept of the continental shelf.  
[T]he historic titles which Tunisia acquired in the course of centuries have come to 
anticipate the appearance of the legal concept of natural prolongation, and after the 
appearance of that concept in international law, those titles have come to be the 
manifestation of part of the prolongation. So far from contradicting the natural 
prolongation, they afford the most apt illustration of it ... drawn from history.94 
  
                                                 
91 Ibid. 
92 Symmons, supra note 4, pp. 203-5. See also K. Zou, Law of the Sea in East Asia: Issues and Prospects (Routledge, 
2005), p. 150, where he notes: “China has to prove that its historic rights existed prior to the establishment of the 
customary rules on the continental shelf. Otherwise, China’s claim is only relevant to the EEZ non continental shelf 
area.” 
93 Libya/Tunisia Case, supra note 49, para. 100. Libya had argued that the fishing practice of one state could not “in 
principle prevail over the inherent and ab initio rights of another state in respect of its natural prolongation.” Ibid., p. 




Despite the fact that the approach of the ICJ has been interpreted as rejecting historic rights in the 
context of the delimitation of the continental shelf,95 the ICJ noted the different ways of claiming 
such rights (juridical and historic) but did not say that historic rights cannot play a role in the 
delimitation of the continental shelf. Two dissenting Judges took different positions. Judge Oda 
clearly rejected the relevance of historic rights for the delimitation of the continental shelf,96 while 
Judge Arechaga argued that a legal concept such as the continental shelf “cannot by itself have the 
effect of abolishing or denying acquired or existing rights.”97 O’Connell argued that “the difficulty 
about this [“enjoyment of exclusive or particular benefits leading to entitlement to the area in 
derogation of the standard rules”] is that the continental shelf doctrine of ‘inherency’ is deliberately 
aimed against the operation of the ordinary rule relating to historic rights, so that what is excluded 
as a matter of doctrine cannot be allowed to re-enter as a matter of exception.”98 Tanaka finds that 
these two concepts, namely historic rights based on acquisition and the continental shelf being ipso 
facto and ab initio “are incompatible,” but seems to leave the issue open by saying “hence the 
Court has to face the difficult question of the compatibility between the Grisbadarna rule and the 
concept of the continental shelf.”99 A middle position recognising the customary nature of the 
                                                 
95 Cottier, supra note 54, p. 486, argues that “the fact that the Court suggested that matters may be different in the 
context of the EEZ (not invoked by the parties) suggests that the majority of the court thought historic rights irrelevant 
in the context of the self.”  
96 Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 49, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Oda, p. 211 para. 88.  
97 Ibid., Separate Opinion by Judge Arechaga, para. 82:  
[A] new legal concept, consisting in the notion introduced in 1958 that continental shelf rights are inherent 
or ab initio cannot by itself have the effect of abolishing or denying acquired and existing rights. That 
would be contrary to elementary legal notions and to basic principles of intertemporal law. It would be 
absurd to contend that the Truman proclamation or the 1958 Convention abolished or disregarded pre-
existing rights over the continental shelf, when, on the contrary, they embodied or assimilated those rights 
into the new doctrine.  
Symmons, supra note 4, p. 204, refers to Arechaga’s view as “somewhat isolated”. See also Cottier, supra note 54, pp. 
486-7: “From a historic perspective of the shelf, which only emerged in customary law in the early 1960s, it follows 
that the existence of historical rights cannot be excluded.”  
98 D.P.O’Connell, The International Law of the Sea Vol. II (Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 713; see also 
O’Connell, supra note 43, p. 482. 
99 Y. Tanaka, Predictability and Flexibility in the Law of Maritime Delimitation (Hart, 2006), p. 301. 
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continental shelf as ipso facto and ab initio has been expressed by Gioia who noted that “these 
‘historic rights’ might only survive if it were proved that they have in fact continued to be exercised 
with the acquiescence of the state concerned after the establishment of the customary rules on the 
continental shelf.”100 A critical issue would be the continuation of relevant activities and 
acquiescence of other states following the establishment of the customary rule on the continental 
shelf. 
However, it should be noted that in cases of overlapping continental shelves, historic rights 
do not necessarily contradict the inherent character of the continental shelf, as they determine the 
extent of the continental shelf and not its existence. A state cannot claim historic rights over the 
continental shelf of another state, but could potentially claim rights over parts of the overlapping 
continental shelves vis-à-vis another coastal state. Indeed, the ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya Case 
recognised that the historic rights claimed by Tunisia over the seabed “may be relevant in a number 
of ways”, for example to provide an indication of an established maritime boundary, ensuring that 
there is no encroachment over these rights by this boundary.101 Therefore, such historic quasi-
territorial claims may be relevant with respect to the existence of a maritime boundary and for 
maritime delimitation purposes in overlapping EEZs and continental shelves. Tanaka, though 
generally critical of the relevance of historic rights to the continental shelf, noted that “states will 
not regard a line disregarding their historic rights as equitable.”102 With respect to the delimitation 
of the continental shelf and the EEZ, the reference to “equitable solution” in articles 74 and 83 of 
the LOSC could entail acknowledgement of historic rights as circumstances to be taken into 
                                                 
100 Gioia, supra note 79, p. 372.  
101 See Tunisia/Libya Case, supra note 49, para. 102, regarding the existence of a maritime boundary see para 95 and 
Separate Opinion by Judge Arechaga, supra note 97, para. 79.  
102 Tanaka, supra note 99, p. 301. 
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account in maritime delimitation.103 It should however be noted that international courts and 
tribunals have not found that historic rights have impacted the maritime delimitation based on the 
facts of the cases before them104 and there is limited state practice where historic rights had an 
impact upon a maritime boundary.105  
To what extent are such historic rights possible or relevant outside a maritime delimitation 
framework? A significant difference would be that in the case of maritime delimitation these rights 
operate in a bilateral way (vis-à-vis the other littoral state(s)), whereas in the case of non-
overlapping zones, the rights would operate erga omnes.106 This outcome might be uncommon but 
not necessarily impossible. Gioia argues that “there is in principle no reason why an historic title 
could not be invoked in order to acquire sovereignty over a wider belt of territorial sea, or even 
special sovereign rights falling short of full territorial sovereignty beyond the territorial sea”, but 
admits that “the recent evolution of the law of the sea – the recognition of a 12-mile belt of 
territorial waters and the birth of the new institutions of the continental shelf and of the EEZ – 
appears to have made reliance on exceptional historic titles no longer necessary in order to justify 
such claims.”107 The South China Sea Tribunal has precluded the survival of such rights as a matter 
                                                 
103 See also Gioia, supra note 3, para. 18; Cottier, supra note 54, p. 488; and Separate Opinion by Judge Arechaga, 
supra note 97, p. 123, para. 80. To the contrary, Dissenting Opinion by Judge Oda, supra note 96, p. 211 para. 88. 
Judge Oda relied on the explicit provision regarding historic titles for the delimitation of the territorial sea, and the 
lack for one for the continental shelf in the 1958 Geneva Convention [499 U.N.T.S. 311]. Judge de Arechaga explained 
this discrepancy at para. 80, p. 123 by pointing out that historic factors are within a wider framework of “special 
circumstances” to be taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf.  
104 Interestingly, R. Kolb, Case Law on Equitable Maritime Delimitation: Digest and Commentaries (Brill/Nijhoff, 
2003), p. 185, argues with respect to the Tunisia/Libya Case that “the Court ended up giving full protection to these 
waters without examining whether either their extent or the claim had been materially established. However, it is 
reasonable to suppose that the Court’s approach to this question rested implicitly in the full recognition of those rights, 
both procedurally and substantively”. 
105 Symmons, supra note 4, p. 47, refers to the bilateral maritime delimitation agreement between India and Sri Lanka. 
See also Tanaka, supra note 99, pp. 305-6. 
106 See ibid., pp. 243-4 on the issue of “opposability” with respect to the establishment of historic titles.  
107 Gioia, supra note 3, para. 17.  
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of law and not of factual realities. Kolb referring to the Grisbadarna Arbitration and the 
Tunisia/Libya Case pointed out that for the Court:  
historic rights were not an ordinary relevant circumstance, one which must be weighed 
against other relevant circumstances so that the Court could finally reach a decision. 
On the contrary, they were the basis of a prescriptive title which in principle might 
result in the attribution of the area in question to one of the states in dispute. Here one 
is dealing not with relevant circumstances of a “relative” or “indicative” nature, but 
with a relevant circumstance that is “absolute” or “dispositive” in its nature.108  
 
Taking into account the approach of the ICJ in the Tunisia/Libya Case which advocated respect 
for established historic rights, but also the lack of a general theory and the importance of historic 
particularised regimes, any historic claims should be treated on their own merits according to the 
historical particularities of the claim.  
(ii) Non-exclusive historic rights and traditional fishing rights 
Non-exclusive historic rights, in contrast to the category discussed above, relate to activities 
performed in a non-exclusive way, do not have a zonal impact, and would thus be recognised in 
the maritime zones of another state.109 Blum refers to two types of such historic rights: passage 
and fishing rights.110 International courts and tribunals have mainly discussed fishing rights within 
the framework of maritime delimitation cases. The Tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration 
referred to such traditional fishing activities and found that “by its very nature [the traditional 
fishing regime] is not qualified by the maritime zones specified under the United Nations 
Convention.”111 The Tribunal accepted the preservation of these rights of “free access and 
                                                 
108 Kolb, supra note 104, p. 185. 
109 Ibid., p. 508. With reference to maritime delimitation, this author distinguishes – on the basis of the “rights’ content 
and subject matter” - between exclusive rights “reserved to one of the states and its citizens” and non-exclusive rights 
incurred with the participation of the citizens of both states in the various activities. 
110 Blum, supra note 3, p. 315. 
111 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration, supra note 64, para. 109.  
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enjoyment for the fishermen of both Eritrea and Yemen.”112 It is worth quoting the exact dictum 
of the Tribunal with respect to such rights.  
the conditions that prevailed during many centuries with regard to the traditional 
openness of Southern Red Sea marine resources for fishing, its role as means for 
unrestricted traffic from one side to the other, together with the common use of the 
islands by the populations of both coasts, are all important elements capable of creating 
certain “historic rights” which accrued in favour of both parties through a process of 
historical consolidation as a sort of “servitude internationale” falling short of 
territorial sovereignty. Such historic rights provide a sufficient legal basis for 
maintaining certain aspects of a res communis that has existed for centuries for the 
benefit of populations on both sides of the Red Sea.113 
  
The Tribunal clarified the traditional fishing regime as follows: it “is not an entitlement in common 
to resources nor is it a shared right in them. Rather, it entitles both Eritrean and Yemeni fishermen 
to engage in artisanal fishing around the islands which, in its Award on sovereignty, the Tribunal 
attributed to Yemen.”114 Judge Oda in his separate opinion in the Tunisia/Libya Case, which 
rejected the relevance of historic rights for the delimitation of the continental shelf, noted that “this 
is not incompatible with the principle that any historic fishing rights based on longstanding practice 
should be respected whatever the status of the submerged areas under the new regime.”115 The 
Tribunal in the Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration also touched upon this issue with 
respect to access to specific fish species (fly-fishing) regardless of the existence of the boundary. 
                                                 
112 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Territorial Sovereignty), supra note 65, para. 527. 
113 Ibid., para. 126. McDorman, supra note 56, argues that the Award indicates that “a historic fishing right ascribed 
to foreign fishers within the waters of a coastal state does not trump coastal state sovereignty’ and that it ‘supports the 
view that historic fishing rights by a third state in waters otherwise under the jurisdiction of a coastal state are not 
necessarily extinguished by UNCLOS” and concludes that “as the Eritrea/Yemen arbitration makes clear, historic 
rights in limited circumstances may exist that, while they do not undermine the sovereignty of the adjacent coastal 
state, require tolerance and attention to be paid by the coastal state.” This author does not seem to differentiate between 
the regimes in the territorial sea and EEZ.  
114 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), supra note 64, para 103. 
115 Tunisia/Libya Case, Judge Oda’s dissenting opinion, supra note 96, p. 211 para. 88. 
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It implied that theoretically this may be possible, but that it did not have jurisdiction due to article 
297(3)(a) of the LOSC.116 
The Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration referred to non-exclusive historic rights as 
fishing rights or rights of access117 and discussed them in relation to traditional fishing rights in 
the territorial sea and the EEZ. The Philippines invoked such rights (though refraining from calling 
them historic) to justify their claim concerning the Tribunal’s jurisdiction with respect to activities 
of Philippine fishermen in the territorial sea of Scarborough Shoal and the infringement of their 
rights by China.118 The Tribunal in the Jurisdictional Award cited the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration 
and accepted “that traditional fishing rights may exist even within the territorial waters of another 
state.”119 In the Merits Award, the Tribunal accepted the Philippines’ argument regarding the 
preservation of traditional fishing rights in a state’s territorial sea and found that China had 
breached international law by not respecting the traditional fishing rights of Filipino fishermen.120  
The South China Sea Tribunal relied on what it described as the international law on 
traditional fishing and distinguished between the territorial sea and EEZ on the basis of their 
history and evolution. The core of the Tribunal’s position and description of such rights is as 
follows. 
The legal basis for protecting artisanal fishing stems from the notion of vested rights 
and the understanding that, having pursued a livelihood through artisanal fishing over 
an extended period, generations of fishermen have acquired a right, akin to property, 
in the ability to continue to fish in the manner of their forbearers.  Thus, traditional 
fishing rights extend to artisanal fishing that is carried out largely in keeping with the 
                                                 
116 The Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration, supra note 48, para. 272, “decided that the pattern of fishing 
activity in the waters off Trinidad and Tobago was not of such a nature as to warrant the adjustment of the maritime 
boundary. This does not, however, mean that the argument based upon fishing activities is either without factual 
foundation or without legal consequences”.  On the lack of jurisdiction, see para. 283. 
117 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 225. 
118 Submission 10 reads: “China has unlawfully prevented Philippine fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by 
interfering with traditional fishing activities at Scarborough Shoal.” Ibid., para. 758.  
119 South China Sea Arbitration, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 8, para. 407.  
120 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 814. The Tribunal also pointed that that “this 
decision is entirely without prejudice to the question of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal”. 
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longstanding practice of the community, in other words to “those entitlements that all 
fishermen have exercised continuously through the ages,” (Eritrea/Yemen case, para. 
104) but not to industrial fishing that departs radically from traditional practices.121 
  
The rights recognised and discussed by the Tribunal are private rights belonging to individuals and 
their communities but not the state. It thus invoked relevant case law related to respect for the 
rights of foreign nationals in cases of land boundary delimitation.122 However, the approach of the 
Tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration upon which the South China Sea Tribunal relied was 
rather unclear about the nature of the recognised rights. The Tribunal in the Eritrea/Yemen 
Arbitration referred to “certain ‘historic rights’ which accrued in favour of both parties” implying 
that the rights belong to the states, and then continued to state that “this right entitles the fishermen 
of both states to engage in artisanal fishing.”123 In its Award on maritime delimitation the Tribunal 
referred to the non-application of “the western legal fiction ... whereby all legal rights, even those 
in reality held by individuals, were deemed to be those of the state.”124 These may be considered 
to be hybrid rights belonging to the state for the benefit of its nationals but also to those nationals 
themselves. It has been suggested that historic (fishing) rights belonging to the state normally arise 
due to the activities of individuals without necessary involvement of the state.125 This is in contrast 
to historic titles or exclusive historic rights which require some sovereign animus. In terms of their 
establishment, the South China Sea Tribunal noted that “traditional fishing rights are customary 
rights, acquired through long usage”126 and in this respect, they share some of the requirements of 
                                                 
121 Ibid., para. 798. 
122 Ibid., para. 799. 
123 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Territorial Sovereignty), supra note 65, para. 126.  
124 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), supra note 64, para. 101. The South China Sea Tribunal quoted 
this to support its consideration of these rights as private rights and not rights belonging to the state. South China Sea 
Arbitration, Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 798. 
125 G. Fitzmaurice, “The law and procedure of the ICJ, 1951-1954: General principles and sources of law” 30 British 
Yearbook of International Law (1953), p. 51 and Blum, supra note 3, p. 314.  
126 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 806. 
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historic rights, namely a certain activity and passage of time. However, it seems that the threshold 
for the recognition of these rights may be lower than historic rights.127 
The scope and beneficiaries of these rights are not very clearly identified by the South China 
Sea Tribunal. Such traditional/artisanal fishing rights are normally linked with the rights of local 
people to pursue their livelihood, and their exercise relates to the traditions and customs of a 
community.128 The issue of dependence on fishing resources for livelihood has also been invoked 
with respect to fishing practices impacting on maritime delimitation.129 In the Trinidad and Tobago 
and Barbados Arbitration, Barbados invoked human rights instrument to support and strengthen 
its argument with respect to the rights of fishermen regarding fly-fishing in the area.130 The content 
and the scope of the right will depend on the performed activities. In this sense, traditional artisanal 
rights have a qualitative element related to the fishing gear, the customs and traditions of a 
community. The South China Sea Tribunal referred to international instruments with respect to 
artisanal fishing131 and provided the following characteristics for these rights (in contrast to 
industrial/commercial fishing).  
[T]he essential defining element of artisanal fishing remains, as the tribunal in Eritrea 
v Yemen noted, relative. The specific practice of artisanal fishing will vary from region 
to region, in keeping with local customs. Its distinguishing characteristic will always 
be that, in contrast with industrial fishing, artisanal fishing will be simple and carried 
out on a small scale, using fishing methods that largely approximate those that have 
historically been used in the region.132 
  
                                                 
127 Ibid., paras. 805-6. With respect to evidence, the Tribunal noted that “matters of evidence should be approached 
with sensitivity” and specifically referred to the fact that the stories of these traditional fishermen “have not been the 
subject of written records’ and ’that certain livelihoods have not been considered of interest to official record keepers 
or to the writers of history does not make them less important to those who practise them.”  
128 Ibid., para. 798. 
129 See, for example, Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v Norway), 
[1993] I.C.J. Reports, paras. 73-76. This is the only case where fishing practices were clearly taken into account for 
the delimitation of the maritime boundary. See also Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration, supra note 48, 
paras. 247-252, 267. 
130 Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Arbitration, supra note 48, para. 136. 
131 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 797. 
132 Ibid., para. 797.   
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These elements would normally be found in local communities of neighbouring states.  
The South China Sea Tribunal further found that such traditional artisanal rights have been 
preserved only in the territorial sea and not in the EEZ. The Tribunal justified this discrepancy 
between the two zones by stressing that “the law reflects the particular circumstances of the 
creation of the exclusive economic zone.”133  The Tribunal argued that “under the law existing 
prior to the exclusive economic zone, […] [t]he expansion of jurisdiction was considered 
equivalent to the adjustment of a boundary or a change in sovereignty, and acquired rights, in 
particular to fisheries, were considered protected.”134 The Tribunal reviewed the fishing regime in 
the EEZ and concluded that it “does not consider it possible that the drafters of the Convention 
intended for traditional or artisanal fishing rights to survive the introduction of the exclusive 
economic zone.”135 
A number of comments can be made. Before the adoption of the LOSC, the boundaries of 
the territorial sea were elusive, and fishing (including traditional fishing) was undertaken in areas 
regardless of the boundaries adopted and consolidated later. Not all states had territorial seas of 12 
nm. This is evident in the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration where the Tribunal rightly noted that these 
fishing rights continue to exist regardless of the maritime zone and thus even beyond the territorial 
sea.136 The Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration disagreed with the dictum of the Tribunal 
in the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration and attempted to distinguish the two cases, accepting the relevant 
argument advanced by the Philippines. The main reason was the applicability of article 293 of the 
LOSC (upon which the Tribunal had relied to conclude that historic rights had been superseded by 
the LOSC). The Tribunal noted that the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration “was not an arbitration under 
                                                 
133 Ibid., para. 801. 
134 Ibid., para. 802. 
135 Ibid., para. 803. 
136 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), supra note 64, para. 109.  
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Annex VII to the Convention and that arbitral tribunal was not bound by article 293 to apply only 
the Convention and rules of law not incompatible therewith.”137 It found that “instead, the parties’ 
arbitration agreement empowered the arbitral tribunal in the second stage of the proceedings to 
render its decision ‘taking into account the opinion that it will have formed on questions of 
territorial sovereignty, the UN Convention on the law of the sea, and any other pertinent factor’138” 
and concluded that “the Arbitral Tribunal in Eritrea v Yemen was thus empowered to – and in the 
Tribunal’s view did – go beyond the law on traditional fishing as it would exist under the 
Convention.”139 This is an unconvincing argument. It appears illogical that the Eritrea/Yemen 
Tribunal, which had been asked to apply the LOSC, would also apply (or would be free to apply) 
rules incompatible to the LOSC. Reference to “other factors” does not give a Tribunal carte 
blanche to apply whatever rules it considers relevant even when they are contrary to the LOSC. It 
is also interesting that despite the fact that the parties asked the Eritrea/Yemen Tribunal to take 
into account historic titles in the first phase of the Arbitration regarding sovereignty over the 
islands,140 there is no such mention with respect to the second phase on maritime delimitation. The 
preservation of traditional/historic rights regardless of the maritime zones reflects the realities and 
circumstances of a maritime area and not necessarily (general) legal developments.  
Examining the historic development of both the territorial sea and the EEZ, commonalities 
can be identified with respect to the debate about the continuation of pre-existing fishing practices 
or rights of third states. The issue of non-exclusive historic fishing rights was discussed at 
UNCLOS II as part of the regime of the territorial sea especially due to the trend of unilateral 
                                                 
137 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 259.  
138 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Maritime Delimitation), supra note 46, Annex I –Arbitration Agreement, article 2(3).  
139 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 259. 
140 Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration (Territorial Sovereignty), supra note 65, para. 2, the arbitration agreement on the issue 
of sovereignty between the parties provided that “… concerning questions of territorial sovereignty, the Tribunal shall 
decide in accordance with the principles, rules and practices of international law applicable to the matter, and on the 
basis, in particular, of historic titles”.  
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expansion of the territorial sea of the coastal state in parts of the high seas which used to be open 
to fishermen from different countries. It was disputed whether these discussions even concerned 
historic rights141 as they focused on states which had been fishing in the specific areas even for 5-
10 years legally as part of the freedom of the high seas. This discussion was about continuation of 
access to the resources despite the expansion of the territorial sea.142 The discussions were centred 
in finding a compromise for the transition to the exclusive fishing right of the coastal state ensuring 
that third states which used to fish in the area were not adversely affected. Blum notes that 
following the inability of the Conference to decide on this issue, fishing rights of third states in the 
territorial sea were subsequently dealt with through bilateral fishing agreements.143  
The only provision where the LOSC has explicitly referred to traditional fishing rights is 
article 51 regarding archipelagic waters. Archipelagic states have the obligation to recognise 
“traditional fishing rights and other legitimate activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring 
states in certain areas falling within archipelagic waters”. The terms and details of these rights are 
to be regulated by bilateral agreement between the states concerned. Could this be an indication 
that traditional fishing rights have been rejected in other maritime zones? The South China Sea 
Tribunal found that in combination with article 62 of the LOSC, this is the case for the EEZ, but 
not for the territorial sea. With respect to the EEZ, the Tribunal relied on the travaux of the LOSC 
EEZ regime and especially of article 62(3)144 which has also been invoked in the academic 
                                                 
141 See comments by France and Australia cited in Blum, supra note 3, pp. 318-9. Blum argued that “it is difficult to 
see how rights of such a temporary nature, which are to be enjoyed only for a definite period of time and not in 
perpetuity, are to be regarded as ‘historic rights’ in the meaning normally attached to this term”. See also D.W. Bowett, 
“The Second UN Conference on the Law of the Sea” 9 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1960), p. 424. 
142 Some delegations opposed the recognition of existing fishing practices/rights as this would discriminate against 
newly-emergent states and states without distant fleets due to lack of economic resources. Blum, supra note 3, p. 317. 
143 Ibid., p. 319.  
144 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 804 (b), notes that “the Tribunal considers that 
the inclusion of this provision – which would be entirely unnecessary if traditional fishing rights were preserved in 
the EEZ – confirms that the drafters of the Convention did not intend to preserve such rights.” See also similar 
argument with respect to article 51(1) regarding archipelagic waters at ibid, para. 804 (a).   
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literature as evidence that pre-existing historic rights have been superseded by the LOSC.145 This 
provision was the outcome of negotiations with respect to the regulatory and management regime 
concerning how a coastal state would exercise its sovereign rights to ensure optimum utilisation. 
In this framework, suggestions were made for access to the resources of third states mainly 
developing and disadvantaged states. Some states referred to “traditional fishing by foreign 
fishermen”, “states that have normally fished for a resource”, access to the living resources of the 
economic zone “on the basis of equity and of long and mutually recognised use.”146 Article 62(3) 
of the LOSC refers to those who have “habitually fished in the zone;” this “habitual fishing” may 
not be considered to be the same as historic rights which require more than the habitual exercise 
of an activity. It cannot be concluded with certainty that it was the intention of states to eliminate 
any historic rights in EEZs. Also this cannot be perceived as a clear indication that the private 
rights of individuals, such as the type of traditional/artisanal fishing rights accepted by the South 
China Sea Tribunal, have been phased out without an explicit provision.147 States, mainly 
neighbouring, have invoked such rights and in some instances these rights have been recognised 
in bilateral maritime negotiations agreements.148 These rights should be examined on a case-by-
case basis taking into account the local circumstances and the intention of the relevant states.  
                                                 
145 Symmons, supra note 2, pp. 195-6 and R. Beckman, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the maritime 
disputes in the South China Sea” 107 American Journal of International Law (2013), p. 158.  
146 A.N. Nandan and A. Rosenne (eds.), UNCLOS 1982: A Commentary Vol. II (Martinus Nijhoff, 2002), p. 627. 
147 The Tribunal invoked and quoted the Question relating to Settlers of German Origin in Poland, Advisory Opinion, 
PCIJ Series B, No. 6, p. 36 and the Abyei Arbitration Government of Sudan v Sudan Pelpel’s Liberation 
Movement/Army) Final Award of 22 June 2009, RIAA Vol. XXX, para. 766; according to the latter: “traditional rights, 
in the absence of an explicit agreement to the contrary, have usually been deemed to remain unaffected by any 
territorial delimitation”. South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 799. This referred to “explicit 
agreement to the contrary” which is not the case with the EEZ LOSC provisions that have no direct and explicit 
reference to these rights.  
148 Tanaka, supra note 99, pp. 305-6. See also L. Bernard, “The effect of historic fishing rights in maritime boundaries 
delimitation” in Proceedings from the 2012 LOSI-KIOST Conference on Securing the Ocean for the Next Generation, 
p. 9.  available at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Bernard-final.pdf. 
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The South China Sea Tribunal having referred to fishing rights of third states in other 
maritime zones and stressed the scope and nature of the territorial sea.  
(c) Finally, in the territorial sea, the Convention continued the existing legal regime 
largely without change.  The innovation in the Convention was the adoption of an 
agreed limit of 12 nautical miles on the breadth of the territorial sea, not the 
development of its legal content.  The Tribunal sees nothing that would suggest that 
the adoption of the Convention was intended to alter acquired rights in the territorial 
sea and concludes that within that zone – in contrast to the exclusive economic zone – 
established traditional fishing rights remain protected by international law.149  
 
The Tribunal seems to be relying on the absence of a provision regarding historic/traditional 
fishing in the territorial sea. It did not explain why states would accept (or have accepted) such a 
restriction in a zone in which they exercise sovereignty (and which is very important both for 
economic and security reasons), but not in a maritime zone farther away from their coasts in which 
they exercise sovereign rights. This argument also contradicts the argument advanced by the 
Tribunal concerning the non-preservation of historic rights due to the lack of an explicit provision 
preserving such rights, but also the incompatibility of such rights with the regime of the LOSC. 
Nor is this approach supported by relying on article 2(3) of the LOSC – “The sovereignty over the 
territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and to other rules of international law” – and 
the lack of such a provision in the LOSC regarding other maritime zones.150 The rationale of article 
2(3) was to ensure that the maximum of state competence, namely sovereignty, is exercised in line 
with international rules151 and not as the coastal state unilaterally desires. What is more, article 
                                                 
149 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 804.  
150 For the Philippines’ argument, see South China Sea Arbitration, Merits Pleadings, Day 2, supra note 55, pp. 164-
174. 
151 The provision was transferred verbatim from article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. The ILC’s Commentary on article 2 of its draft articles of 1956 mentioned: “(3) 
Clearly, sovereignty over the territorial sea cannot be exercised otherwise than in conformity with the provisions of 
international law. (4) Some of the limitations imposed by international law on the exercise of sovereignty in the 
territorial sea are set forth in the present articles which cannot, however, be regarded as exhaustive. Incidents in the 
territorial sea raising legal questions are also governed by the general rules of international law, and these cannot be 
specially codified in the present draft for the purposes of their application to the territorial sea. That is why ‘other rules 
of international law’ are mentioned in addition to the provisions contained in the present articles.” Report of the ILC 
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58(2) of the LOSC clearly provides that “other pertinent rules of international law apply to the 
exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part”.  
There is no convincing reason for the differentiation between the territorial sea and the EEZ 
with respect to traditional/historic fishing rights, especially for the type of individual rights 
recognised by the South China Sea Tribunal. The existence and relevance of these rights should 
be examined on the basis of the circumstances of each maritime area and should be respected to 
the extent that their establishment can be ascertained.  
V. Requirements for the Establishment of Historic Rights/Titles  
 
The Tribunal only briefly discussed the requirements and criteria for the establishment of historic 
rights. Despite the fact that it had already provided an answer to the Philippines’ submissions (No. 
1-2) and had accepted that any historic rights in the EEZ and continental shelf have been 
superseded by the LOSC, it found it relevant to “consider what would be required for it to find that 
China did have historic maritime rights to the living and non-living resources within the nine-dash 
line”.152  
The Tribunal acknowledged the criteria identified by the U.N. Study on Historic Waters 
and specifically referred to the “continuous exercise of the claimed right by the state asserting the 
claim and acquiescence on the part of other affected states.”153 It also found that despite the fact 
that the U.N. Study referred to the establishment of historic titles/waters, “the process is the same 
for claims to rights short of sovereignty.”154 The Tribunal made some generally uncontroversial 
comments concerning the type of evidence which would be required for China (or any state) to 
                                                 
to the General Assembly (Doc. A/3159), Yearbook of the ILC 1956 Vol. II, p. 265. See also Nandan and Rosenne, 
supra note 146, pp. 72-3.  
152 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 267 
153 Ibid., para. 265. 
154 Ibid.  
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prove the existence of historic rights. It noted that “either party’s historical use of the islands of 
the South China Sea is of no interest with respect to the formation of historic rights,”155 and found 
that much of the evidence related to the islands (and therefore supporting the sovereignty aspects 
of the dispute) “has nothing to do with the question of whether China has historically had rights to 
living and non-living resources beyond the limits of the territorial sea in the South China Sea and 
therefore is irrelevant to the matters before this Tribunal.”156 It also pointed out that “the exercise 
of freedoms permitted under international law cannot give rise to a historic right; it involves 
nothing that would call for the acquiescence of other states and can only represent the use of what 
international law already freely permits.”157 This is in line with the dictum of the Chamber in the 
Gulf of Maine Case, and confirms that the exercise of activities needs to be as an exception to the 
established regime. The exercise of activities to the exclusion of others would, however, provide 
evidence that a state is exercising exceptional rights regardless of the potential freedom of the high 
seas. This is admitted by the Tribunal: “it would be necessary to show that China had historically 
sought to prohibit or restrict the exploitation of such resources by the nationals of other states and 
that those states had acquiesced in such restrictions.”158 In cases of non-exclusive fishing rights, 
however, such rights can be preserved even if they were initially exercised as part of the freedom 
of the high seas as these rights form part of a shared regime according to the dictum of the Tribunal 
in the Eritrea/Yemen Arbitration.   
With respect to activities on the continental shelf related to exploitation of natural 
resources, the Tribunal argued that it is “theoretically impossible” for such activities to lead to 
historic rights as “seabed mining was a glimmer of an idea when the seabed Committee began the 
                                                 
155 Ibid., para. 267. 
156 Ibid., para. 264.  
157 Ibid., paras. 268-269.  
158 Ibid., para. 270.  
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negotiations that led to the Convention. Offshore oil extraction was in its infancy and only recently 
became possible in deep water areas.”159 This does not, however, preclude activities related to the 
exploitation of other resources of the continental shelf, especially sedentary species (i.e. sponge or 
pearl fishing), though admittedly solely one activity may not lead to historic rights over a certain 
maritime zone.  
VI. Article 298(1)(a)(i) Optional Exceptions to Jurisdiction and Disputes Involving 
Historic Titles 
 
In the Jurisdiction Award, the Tribunal found that its jurisdiction would depend on the nature 
of the Chinese historic claim and on whether this was excluded by article 298 of the LOSC 
regarding disputes involving “historic bays or titles.”160 In the Merits, the Tribunal examined the 
scope and definition of “historic titles” in the framework of this optional exception and the nature 
and scope of China’s claim.161 As mentioned above, the Tribunal agreed with the approach of the 
Philippines with respect to the nature and the scope of the Chinese historic claim in the South 
China Sea, as historic rights to the living and non-living resources and not as a historic sovereignty 
claim. With respect to the scope of the optional exception of article 298(1)(a)(i), the Tribunal 
rightly rejected the Philippines’ narrow reading based on a textual interpretation of the English 
text of the Convention that this exception refers only to disputes related to maritime delimitation 
involving historic bays and titles. The Tribunal noted that the English text entailed some ambiguity 
and then referred to the equally authentic Chinese, French, Russian and Spanish versions of the 
                                                 
159 Ibid., para. 270. 
160 South China Sea Arbitration Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 8, para. 168. Talmon argued 
(according to Symmons “unconvincingly”; Symmons, supra note 2, p. 234, note 249) that “as historic titles do not 
concern the application or interpretation of UNCLOS, they are not subject to the compulsory jurisdiction under articles 
286 and 288(1) – and that the question of whether the PRC’s claims are invalid or unlawful cannot be answered 
without deciding upon historic titles and rights which are outside the jurisdiction of the tribunal.” Talmon, supra note 
47, pp. 10 and 48 et seq. 
161 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Merits), supra note 6, para. 206. 
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Convention to conclude that “the broader exception in the non-English texts, ‘for disputes … 
involving historic bays or titles’ best reconciles the different versions.”162  
With respect to the scope of the concept of historic titles in article 298, the Tribunal accepted 
the interpretation suggested by the Philippines, and distinguished between “historic titles” and 
“historic rights short of sovereignty” which the Tribunal had concluded was the case of the Chinese 
claim. The Tribunal noted that although “the ordinary meaning of this term [historic title] already 
implies a notion of property, the Tribunal considers that the meaning of the Convention’s reference 
to ‘historic titles’ should be understood in the particular context of the evolution of the international 
law of the sea.”163 It then provided a brief overview of the inclusion of the concept of historic titles 
in the LOSC, and concluded that “the reference to ‘historic titles’ in article 298(1)(a)(i) of the 
Convention is accordingly a reference to claims of sovereignty over maritime areas derived from 
historical circumstances.”164  
As analysed above, historic titles are normally associated with the exercise of sovereignty 
over the waters. A narrow interpretation of “historic titles” in article 298(1)(a) would concern 
sovereignty claims over the waters.  Symmons argues that this is “a very semantic argument in the 
light of the loose terminology relating to historic maritime claims.”165 The LOSC does not have 
any reference to historic rights, and as mentioned above, two types of historic rights short of 
sovereignty could be discerned – historic rights with a zonal quasi-territorial impact and non-
                                                 
162 Ibid., paras. 215-6 
163 Ibid., para. 217. 
164 The Tribunal noted that “this usage was understood by the drafters of the Convention”. Ibid, para. 226. 
165 See Symmons, supra note 2, p. 234, note 249. S. Yee, “The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v China): 
Potential jurisdictional obstacles or objections” 13 Chinese Journal of International Law (2014), p. 730, also points 
out that “often ‘historic title’ and ‘historic rights’ – a broader term – are used interchangeably, and thus historic title 
may be interpreted to cover both claims regarding sovereignty rights – territorial titles – and claims relating to non-
sovereignty rights or non-territorial rights”.  
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exclusive historic rights. The Tribunal did not distinguish between the different types of historic 
rights short of sovereignty. 
In the case of non-exclusive historic rights, it can be easily assumed that there is no 
entitlement over maritime space and that, therefore, they would normally relate to activities within 
the framework of an existing maritime zone belonging to another state. These rights are, therefore, 
outside the scope of the optional exception of article 298(1)(a). They may, however, come under 
other exceptions. For example, historic fishing rights in the EEZ would be “excluded” by virtue of 
article 297(3)(a). On the other hand, historic rights with a quasi-territorial zonal impact create an 
entitlement, though short of sovereignty, over a maritime area due to the exclusivity in the exercise 
of sovereign rights. Although a narrow interpretation would restrict the optional exception of 
article 298(1)(a) to sovereignty claims, a contextual interpretation would also require such quasi-
titles based on sovereign rights to be excluded. In most instances, at least as invoked before courts 
and tribunals, these rights will arise within the framework of maritime delimitation as 
circumstances to be taken into account for the designation of the boundary line and would thus be 
covered by the maritime delimitation optional exception (article 298(1)(a)). It may appear 
contradictory (and against the object and purpose of the optional exception) that historic rights 
with a quasi-territorial impact which are not regulated by the LOSC but by customary international 
law can be solved via compulsory jurisdiction by virtue of article 293, but historic titles with 
respect to internal and territorial waters, which are explicitly provided for by the LOSC, are 
excluded.  
The Tribunal did not engage in a teleological interpretation of the provision which was also 
part of the Philippines’ argument. The Philippines argued that “an exclusion from jurisdiction for 
claims of historic rights incompatible with the Convention would undermine the object and 
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purpose of the Convention, including both its dispute settlement and its substantive provisions.”166 
This is contradictory as to what extent the historic rights are incompatible with the Convention 
will require the examination of the substantive aspects which might be excluded by article 
298(1)(a) and would not, therefore, undermine the object and purpose of the Convention and the 
dispute settlement system. Nonetheless, the question which was the core of the Tribunal’s 
discussion, namely whether the LOSC has generally superseded historic rights would still pass the 
threshold of jurisdiction as it would not refer to the assessment of a specific historic claim, but to 
the interaction of the LOSC with historic titles/rights.167 
VII. Conclusion 
The Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration significantly restricted the scope and 
contemporary relevance of historic claims. It found that the LOSC supersedes any previous historic 
titles/rights apart from those explicitly recognised in articles 10 and 15, namely historic bays and 
historic titles in the territorial sea/internal waters. This article disagrees with the reasoning of the 
Tribunal and argues that the consideration of the preservation of historic rights cannot be made in 
abstracto but only with reference to the specific instance of historic rights. It is true that since the 
adoption of the LOSC and the expansion of the jurisdiction of the coastal state, pre-existing historic 
claims have been validated and have become juridical based on the maritime zones recognised by 
the LOSC. Nevertheless, this does not preclude the potential existence of historic rights alongside 
the LOSC regime as long as the requirements for their establishment have been met. Historic rights 
relate to a particularised regime which reflects a continuous, long-established and undisturbed 
                                                 
166 South China Sea Arbitration, Merits Pleadings, Day 1, supra note 55, p. 52. 
167 Beckman, supra note 38, p. 26 para. 114agrees with the narrow interpretation of historic titles, and argues that “if 
China were to argue that it has the right under international law to exercise historic rights in the waters inside the nine 
dashed lines, a dispute could arise over whether such rights are consistent with UNCLOS, and such dispute would not 
be excluded by the declaration”..  
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situation. They should be assessed on a case-by-case basis according to the historical particularities 
and realities of the claim.  
Whereas there is consensus that historic titles may exist with respect to the territorial 
sea/internal waters (normally referred to as historic waters), the issue of historic rights short of 
sovereignty is more controversial. Two types of such rights have been identified in this article 
based on claims by states within the framework of maritime delimitation disputes and the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals – historic rights short of sovereignty which have 
a quasi-territorial or zonal impact beyond the territorial sea; and non-exclusive historic rights.  
Non-exclusive historic rights have mainly been accepted with respect to historic fishing 
rights. The South China Sea Tribunal recognised the existence of traditional fishing rights of 
fishermen of the littoral states in the area around the Scarborough Shoal. There is some uncertainty 
about the scope of these rights, but they seem to be closely linked to the fishing communities, their 
livelihood, traditions and customs including fishing methods. These have been presented by the 
Tribunal as rights belonging to individuals and not to states. However, the distinction between 
non-exclusive historic rights belonging to the state and traditional fishing rights belonging to 
individuals is not very clear and it has been suggested that these may be hybrid rights belonging 
to the individuals but also to the state of their nationality to the extent that they benefit these 
individuals. The Tribunal accepted that these rights have been preserved only in the territorial sea 
and not in the EEZ distinguishing this case from the arbitration award in the Eritrea/Yemen 
Arbitration which accepted the preservation of such rights even beyond the territorial sea. This 
article has argued that there is no convincing argument to differentiate between the territorial sea 
and the EEZ and the potential preservation of such rights depend on historic circumstances and 
realities of the area and the requirements for the establishments of such rights.  
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The issue of the potential historic rights short of sovereignty with a zonal impact beyond the 
territorial sea is more complicated and controversial. Arguments have been raised by states within 
the framework of maritime delimitation disputes and have been examined by international courts 
and tribunals. Despite the fact that courts and tribunals have not accepted the claims due to lack of 
evidence, they have not precluded their potential relevance in the law of the sea. In overlapping 
maritime zones, these rights relate to the location of the maritime boundary and the extent of a 
state’s maritime zones vis-à-vis another coastal state. To what degree these rights can be accepted 
outside the framework of maritime delimitation is unclear and it would relate to the specific 
circumstances of each situation. With the exception of the Chinese claim, no such claim has been 
raised outside a maritime delimitation context.  
It is true that excessive claims could destabilise the jurisdictional regime established by the 
LOSC. However, the nature and rationale of historic rights is to preserve stability and order based 
on the acceptance of a certain regime for a long period of time. Historic rights reflect an 
undisturbed and long established situation and particular circumstances and realities of a maritime 
area, but require a high threshold of evidence as they form an exception to the general rules.  
 
